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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To begin with, laws governing broadcasting are a political necessity.
Indeed, broadcasting may be an instrument of political control or an
instrument of political freedom, depending upon the presuppositions,
character, and processes of political systems and cultures. Any concept
of the role of government in the regulation of broadcasting necessarily
reflects a particular political philosophy. Each country has adopted such
laws in accordance with its own conceptions of public interest. Therefore
many aspects of broadcasting can be understood only in a political context.
To a marked degree broadcasting involves the basic political philosophy of
a country, and we shall find that the study of the control of broadcasting
in the United States will illuminate a number of concepts underlying our
own system of government.
This thesis is a study of the regulation of political broadcasting
in the United States. It is concerned with the rights and obligations of
candidates for public office in relation to the broadcasting media. An
analysis of federal statutes, F.C.C. rules and state regulations is per
formed in order to determine these rights and obligations.
1Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America (Boston, 1956), p. 297.
2
Materials used in this study were obtained from the Congressional
Record. Statutes at Large, books, articles, and rules and regulations
of the F.C.C.
The procedure used in this investigation is as follows: (1) a
general history of broadcasting regulation, (2) federal statutes speci
fically relating to political broadcasting, (3) rules and regulations of
the F.C.C, (4) state regulation and (5) summary and conclusion. Rules
and regulations are discussed in connection with the political background
that helped to shape them.
The significance of the study is the insight it provides into the
regulations governing the broadcasting media in our democratic society.
This study also gives, in an analytical and descriptive manner, the rights
and obligations that a candidate for public office has over the broadcasting
media.
General History
The Constitution states: '"Congress shall have the power to regulate
2
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states". Thus, with
out being aware of it, member of the Constitutional Convention bestowed upon
the Federal Government the authority to control and regulate, in all its
aspects, radio and television broadcasting.
The Constitution does not define the word "commerce". But as the
nation grew and developed it became apparent that a definition of the word
would have to be made by the courts. John Marshall was the first to state
2U. S., Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3.
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the definition in legal terms. Marshall wrote: "Commerce among the state
consists of intercourse and traffic among their citizens, in all its
branches, and includes the transportation of persons and property and the
3
navigation of public waters for that purpose".
In 1905, Mr. Justice Brown had this to say: "The commerce clause is
perhaps the most benign gift of the Constitution.... Without it the
Constitution could not have been adopted".
As new and better methods of transporting passengers and cargo de
veloped, they too came under Marshall's definition. Traffic and intercourse
increased in quantity and were accelerated by technological advances and came
to involve more people as the country grew but the basic idea of the under
taking remained the same.
With the advent of the ability to transmit ideas and opinions from
one point to another using electricity and wires, the time came for the
highest court to answer the question: were telegraphic messages commerce?
Did transmission of telegraphic messages between states, involving the
movement of nothing concrete, constitute interstate commerce and warrant
regulation by Congress under its constitutional powers? The Court's answer
was yes.
Congress, in 1866, passed a law to aid the construction of telegraph
lines.•* The state of Florida attempted to create a monopoly which would
prevent the entrance of telegraphic messages into that state except over
3Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1 (1824).
4Cook v. Marshall County. 196 U.S. 261 (1904).
514 Statutes At Large, 221 (1865).
the wires of the monopoly so established. The Supreme Court held the
Florida statute to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
In rendering its decision the Court called attention to the fact that
Congress could regulate commerce and could establish post offices and postal
routes. The Court also stated that the telegraph was a means of commercial
intercourse crossing state boundaries and was national in scope. Thus,
the Supreme Court said, the transmission of telegraphic messages was inter
state commerce and was subject to congressional regulation.
Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the Court, said:
The powers thus granted (to the Congress) are not con
ditioned to the instrumentalities of commerce or the postal
service known or in use when the Constitution was adopted,
but adapt themselves to the new developments of time and
circumstances. They extend from the horse with its rider
to the stagecoach, from the sailing vessel to the steam
boat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad and
the telegraph, as these new agencies are successively
brought into use to meet the demands of increasing popula
tion and wealth. They were intended for the government of
the business to which they relate, at all times and under
all circumstances. As they were intrusted to the general
government for the good of the nation, it is not only the
right but the duty of Congress to see to it that inter
course among the states, and the transmission of intelli
gence are not obstructed or unnecessarily incumbered by
state legislation.
The electric telegraph marks an epoch in the progress
of time.
It has changed the habits of business, and become one
of the necessities of commerce. It is indispensable as a
means of intercommunication, but especially is it so in
commercial transactions.
Under such circumstances, it cannot for a moment be
doubted that this powerful agency of commerce and
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1
(1877).
intercommunication comes within the controlling power of
Congress.^
Three years later, the Court declared a state tax on interstate tele
graphic messages to be void and reaffirmed that interstate transmission of
telegraphic messages was subject to congressional regulation.
A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce
as a carrier of messages that a railroad does as a carrier
of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce, and
their transportation in different ways and their liabilities
are in some respects different; but they are both indispensable
to those engaged to any extent in commercial pursuits.8
In 1887, the Supreme Court once again had an opportunity to reaffirm
that telegraphic transmissions across state lines constituted interstate
commerce, subject to the jurisdiction of Congress. The Supreme Court said:
It differs not only in the subject which it transmits, but
in its means of transmission. Other commerce deals only
with persons or with visible or tangible things. But the
telegraph transports nothing visible or tangible; it carries
only idea's, wishes, orders, and intelligence. Other com
merce requires the constant supervision and attention of
the carrier for the safety of the persons and property
carried. The message of the telegraph passes at once be
yond control of the sender, and reaches the office to
which it is sent instantaneously. It is plain, from these
essentially different characteristics, that the regulations
suitable for one of the kinds of commerce would be entirely
inapplicable to the other.
Even as the Supreme Court, through the years, was affirming the right
of Congress to regulate wired interstate transmission of telegraphic messages,
men were developing the means to do away with wire and to transmit the
messages through the air. As early as 1865, a brilliant young English
7Ibid.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1886).
9Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887).
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physicist, James Clark Maxwell, a professor at Kings College in London, had
predicted the existence of electromagnetic waves. Some 20 years later, be
tween 1885 and 1887, a German, Heinrich Hertz, was to prove this theory
correct by a series of experiments based upon Maxwell's theory. Hertz
developed a primitive radio transmitter and receiver when he caused a spark
to jump 40 feet through space. Through Hertz's published reports, a 20
year old Italian, Guglielmo Marconi, became interested in the subject and,
in 1895, gave a demonstration of "radiotelegraphy" -- transmission of
signals without wires.11 In 1901, Marconi transmitted a radio signal across
the Atlantic from Cornwall, England, to St. John's, Newfoundland. Others
were experimenting with techniques for communicating speech and music by
wireless rather than simply sending code signals. In 1900, Reginald
Fessenden, a teacher of physics at the University of Pittsburgh, partly
12
succeeded in broadcasting vocal tones from one tower to another a mile away.
In 1906, thanks to the development of the Alexanderson Alternator, a machine
capable of generating a continuous flow of electrical energy, Fessenden was
successful in broadcasting the world's first radio program. ^ Thus broad
casting was born which created another problem involving the commerce clause.
Is radio broadcasting commerce? There has been little argument, due
largely to decisions indicated earlier involving the telegraph, that radio
broadcasting is not commerce. A judicial decision from the nation's highest
10Head, op. cit., p. 91.
11Head, op. cit.. p. 93.
l2Head, op. cit., pp. 103, 104.
13Head, op. cit., p. 85.
court was not even to be handed down on this subject until 1932.
However, before the Supreme Court could act, it was up to Congress
to make the necessary laws to regulate the new medium. Congress had to
face the job of establishing a pattern for radio regulation with no pre
vious experience in a comparable field. Congress had to move cautiously
so as not to overstep double bounds -- the bounds of controls which the
government had set for itself in dealing with private industry, and those
bounds which the Constitution established for preserving freedom of
speech. ■*
As the highest legislative authority in the country, Congress, in
attempting to legislate, became the object of various pressure groups.
Their intention was to influence congressional policy on the regulation of
radio.*' These interests fall into three categories: control, program
content, and adequacy of service. They are all interrelated in one way or
•I Q
another. The hottest issue at first was that of governmental control
because this was a new unregulated medium in the field of commerce. These
groups sought different kinds of governmental policy on the power of station,
•^Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266 (1933).
"Carl J. Friedrich and Evelyn Sternberg, "Congress and the Control
of Radio Broadcasting", American Political Science Review, XXXVII (1937),
1024.
16Ibid., p. 1025.
17Head, op. cit., p. 47.
18H. B. Summers, Radio Censorship (New York, 1939), p. 91.
l9Ibid.. p. 94.
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licensees, and the purchasing of station. Therefore, because of congres
sional inexperience and various pressures, several types of legislation
evolved.
In 1910, Congress passed the first radio act but that law did not,
90
in reality, regulate radio. It required only that ships at sea be
equipped with radio apparatus if they carried 50 or more passengers. The
law further required the following four basic points. They were: (1) that
the radio apparatus should be capable of transmitting and receiving messages
over a distance of 100 miles, (2) that ships at sea should carry on radio
communication business with other ships and with shore stations, (3) that
any vessel whose master left or attempted to leave any port of the United
States without complying with the provisions of the act might have his
vessel libeled in any District Court of the United States and (4) that the Se
cretaries of Commerce and Labor were to administer the law.
22
In 1912, Congress amended the law. The amendment made three changes:
(1) ships plying the Great Lakes were required to meet the conditions of
having adequate radio transmitters and receivers, (2) every ship was required
to have emergency power service capable of sending messages for four hours
in case of failure of the regular power plant; (3) every vessel was required
to have two or more persons aboard capable of operating the equipment in
23
order that a continuous watch on distress frequencies might be kept.
2036 Statutes At Large, 629 (1910).
21Ibid.
2237 Statutes At Large, 199 (1910).
23Ibid.
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During the time Congress was considering legislation for shipboard
radio, it had also been considering the general regulation of broadcasting.
Within three weeks after the passage of the amendment to the first radio
law, Congress approved the Radio Act of 1912, ^
The first important requirement of the law was that a license was
necessary for the operation of a radio transmitter.
Be it enacted...that a person, company, or corporation with
in the jurisdiction of the United States shall not use or
operate any apparatus for radio communication as a means of
commercial intercourse among the several states, or with
foreign nations, or upon any vessel of the United States
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or for the trans
mission of radiograms or signals the effect of which extends
beyond the jurisdiction of the State or Territory in which
the same are made, or where interference would be caused
thereby with the receipt of message or signals from beyond
the jurisdiction of said State or Territory, except under
and in accordance with the license, revocable for cause,
in that behalf granted by the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor upon application therefor.25
Congress clearly indicated that the activity of radio transmission was
considered commerce by its use of the phrase "shall not use...any apparatus
for radio communication as a means of commercial intercourse among the
several states...".
Subsequently, the statute recited that such regulation was confined
to the interstate aspects of commerce and thus indicated that Congress
believed it was acting under the commerce clause of the Constitution. A
continuation of the beginning sentence in Section 1 of the act reads:
"...but nothing in this act shall be construed to apply to the transmission
and exchange of radiograms and signals between points situated in the same
24




Congress possibly could have acted under its constitutional power
to enact laws carrying into effect treaties made by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The Radio Act of 1912 was passed
after the United States had participated in and ratified the Berlin Radio
Convention of 1906. The United States was also represented at the London
Radio Conference of 1912. Of this, one writer says:
This statute (Radio Act of 1912) was the culmination of
several international conventions relating to radio
transmission to which the United States was a party.
The scope and condition of the industry of that time
were such as to make it appear that the most important
jurisdictional power which generated such early legis
lation was that of the Federal government to make and
enforce treaties.27
The Radio Act of 1912 contained other important provisions. Section 2
provided that license for broadcast stations should be issued only to
citizens of the United States. ° This act also set forth what the license
29
would contain. It granted the President authority to seize stations in time
of war, upon just compensation to the owners.30 The Radio Act of 1912 also
required that all persons operating radio transmitters should be licensed.^1
26Ibid.
27A. Walter Socolow, The Law of Radio Broadcasting (New York, 1938),
pp. 1, 2.
OQ





The Radio Act of 1912 established penalties for interfering with radio
communication^ and provided for the suspension of an operator's license
if he permitted an unlicensed person under his supervision to break the
law.33
The Secretary of Commerce was given the right to waive provisions
of regulations established by the act and this subsequently led to the
declaration by one court that if the law were construed to give the
Secretary the powers he claimed, it would be unconstitutional as a dele
gation of administrative power without setting up any standard for ad
ministering the law. The Supreme Court of the United States had no
occasion to consider the validity of the act.
Perhaps Congress did not foresee the use to which the law would be
put (i.e., attempted regulation of commercial broadcasting during the
period 1921-1926) and consequently made no provision for such eventuality.
When a flood of applications for licenses developed in the early 1920's,
the Secretary of Commerce found himself faced with a difficult task. The
law made no provisions for the duration of a license. It said only that
the license was revocable for certain causes. The Secretary limited all
ship and amateur licenses to two years, point-to-point telegraph licenses
to one year, and broadcast licenses to 90 days. These renewals help him
cope with the situation by requiring changes in frequencies, better appara
tus, and other stipulations.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34U. S. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 12 Fed. (2) 614 (1926).
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In 1921, the Secretary of Commerce refused to issue a license on the
ground that such issuance would cause interference with existing stations.
A mandamus proceeding was brought and the Supreme Court of New York held
that the Secretary had no discretion in the matter and must issue a
license. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the
case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error.
However, the station ceased operations before the case came up for a hearing
and the proceedings were dropped.
Requests for licenses came in increasing numbers. By 1922, there
were so many broadcasting stations that a national conference was called
in hope that difficulties could be worked out by mutual agreement. The
conference accomplished little or nothing. A second conference was called
in 1923. By this time there were more than 500 stations on the air.36 Again
the effect was limited. It was apparent that Congress had to act to correct
the situation.
Because of so much confusion and pressures, Congress then passed the
Radio Act of 1927.37 It was hoped that this law would help clear up the
radio situation. However, radio legislation had been under consideration
in the House for three or four years and in 1926 the House passed a radio
bill. The Senate changed certain provisions and the act, as finally passed,
was a composite of the proposals of the two groups.38 The major difference
in the thinking of the two houses was in what governmental agency should
35Hoover v. Intercity Radio. 266 U. S. 636 (1923).
JDClarence C. Dill, Radio Law (Washington, 1938), p. 70.
37
44 Statutes At Large. 1166 (1927).
J0Dill, op. cit., pp. 76, 77.
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control of broadcasting be lodged.
The House bill called for a Federal Radio Commission, which would
act as an appellate body. The Secretary of Commerce was to administer
the law and appeals from his decision would be made to the Commission.
The Senate proposed to place all authority in the Commission itself but
would leave it up to the Secretary to handle the administrative work. The
act, upon passage, actually provided for the Commission to have all the
powers for one year and after that the Secretary would assume the power
for one year. Then the Secretary would assume the power and the Com
mission would become appellate. Apparently Congress felt the new Commission
could clear up the situation within a reasonably short time and there would
on
be little more than routine administrative duties to be handled. Con
gress actually continued the Commission in power for some time and,on
December 18, 1929, made the Commission a permanent organization with
authority to regulate radio. This move occurred after Congress found out
that the situation with the radio needed permanent regulation. This
confusion was created in large part by pressure groups which sought various
types of controls and policies. ^
40Ibid.
41Dill, op. cit., p. 79.
42Dill, op. cit.. p. 80.
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The Radio Act of 1927 contained seven basic points which merit nota
tion.
1) No property right in a frequency or channel was created
by the user.43
2) The test by which the Federal Radio Commission should
determine whether or not to grant a license was unique.44
3) Equal treatment of all political candidates for the same
office was required.4^
4) The Commission was expressly prohibited from censoring
broadcasts. °
5) A station was prohibited from rebroadcasting the signal
of another station without prior permission.47
6) The secrecy of certain radio communication was required.
7) Competition in communications was assured by certain
restrictions involving retransmission by other electrical
means such as telephone and telegraph.49
The act brought a new concept of radio regulation. This was a con
cept of broad regulatory powers on the part of the national government,
with such regulation including the specific provisions indicated above.
Five years passed before the constitutionality of the act was tested.
Most of the early cases encountered procedural difficulties because of ap
pellate provisions written into the act itself. The act provided for appeals








to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in cases where the
Commission had refused the application for a license modification there
of. Finally, a case reached the Supreme Court for consideration. The
highest court refused to rule on the case on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction.50 The Supreme Court set forth the belief that it lacked
jurisdiction because powers granted to the FRC were purely administrative.
Continuing, the Supreme Court stated that it was not entrusted with such
legislative powers.
Following this development, Congress revised the provisions of the
act in 1930 and indicated that review of Commission procedures by the
courts should be limited to the question of law. ^ The Supreme Court up
held the constitutionality of the act of 1927 as a constitutional and valid
delegation of power on the part of Congress (so far as those portions of
the act before it were concerned). The Supreme Court indicated that the
phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity" was not too indefinite
and did not confer legislative power upon the Commission.
In 1928, Congress amended the act of the previous year by saying that
there should be a "fair and equitable allocation of licenses...within each
zone", such zones having been established by the original act. ^ The purpose
of the amendment was to insure geographical equality in authorizing
50General Electric Co. v. F.R.C., 281 U. S. 464 (1930).
51Ibid.
5246 Statutes At Large, 844 (1930).
F.R.C. v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1938).
5445 Statutes At Large, 373 (1928).
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broadcasting stations over the country. The Supreme Court also held in F.R.C.
v« Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co.. 289 U. S. 266 (1938), that the
amendment was constitutional.
In 1933, after considering reorganization procedures for the
national government, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to
centralize all authority to regulate interstate, foreign wire and radio
communications. This Congress did with the Communications Act of 1934.55
This act was also intended to relieve some of the ambiguities of the pre
vious act and to eliminate some of the various pressure groups.^ However,
to a certain extent this act accomplished some of its purposes. Several
pressure groups seeking governmental control policies went out of existence
but new groups seeking different types of control policies arose.5^
The new law delegated the regulation of all communication services in
the United States to the Federal Communication Commission. The new act
embodied the same power and provided for their exercise according to the
same standards as the 1927 act.58
The new act included a definition of radio communication as "the
transmission by radio of writing, signs, signal, pictures and sounds of all
kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services
(among other things the receipt, forwarding and delivery of communications)
5548 Statutes At Large. 1064 (1934).
56Summers, op. cit.. p. 87.
Summers, op. cit., p. 77.
58
Socolow, op. cit., p. 21.
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incidental to such transmission". *
The new governing body was to be composed of seven members, each
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Members hold office for seven years and no more than four members can be
of the same political party. ^
In the present study the Communications Act of 1934 will be examined
only in the light of the provision of Section 315 dealing with "Facilities
for Candidate for Public Office". While the provision of this section is
embodied in only a few words it will be seen that interpretation of the
section is considerably more involved.
5948 Statutes At Large, Sec. 3 (1934).
60Ibid.
CHAPTER II
FEDERAL STATUTES RELATING TO POLITICAL BROADCASTING
In both the 1927 and the 1934 Communications Acts, the principle
was laid down that in the case of political broadcasts, stations permitting
one candidate to make use of their facilities must make time available to
all opposing candidates, on the same basis. In other words, in regard
to political broadcasting, radio is bound by statute to a policy of
"equal opportunity" for both sides or all sides.
The same policy is widely advocated in regard to all controversial
questions. Most persons who have expressed themselves on the subject, ac
cording to H. B. Summers, favor a general policy of complete freedom of
discussion on the air -- permitting free expression of opinion on all
policies of government, on all important social, political or economic
q
questions. Summers also stated that several pressure groups adopted
this policy of equal opportunity for both sides. This idea was therefore
inherent in both Communication Acts.
The Communications Act of 1934 also, with its subsequent amendments,
laid down the basis by which the Federal Communication Commission can and






does regulate broadcasting in the United States. In any examination of
the rules and regulations which the Commission may be empowered to formulate,
some consideration should be given to determining whether the standards
established by Congress are sufficient to sustain the Commission's power,
if such powers are attacked in a competent court of law.
The Act of 1934 is substantially the same as the one passed in 1927.
The primary purpose of the new act is to centralize control of both wire
and radio communications in one body. Hence the 1934 act embodies the same
powers and provides for the exercise of these powers according to the same
general standards as before.
It would appear, then, that the ruling in F.R.C. v. Nelson Bros. Bond
and Mortgage Co., previously considered, would support the validity of the
same provisions in the later act.
The Communications Act itself set forth only a few restrictions upon
the content of broadcast programs. These restrictions upon the prohibition
of obscene, indecent, or profane language; prohibition of the broadcasting
of lottery information; requirements that all sponsored programs be
5F.R.C. v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1933).
648 Statutes At Large, 1091 (1948). It should be noted at this point
that Congress, in 1948, repealed and recodified certain sections of the
Communications Act of 1934. Section 1464 of the Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.
1464) prohibited the use of obscene language on the air. Section 1304 of
the Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. 1304) prohibited the broadcasting of lottery
information on the air.
748 Statutes At Large, 1088 (1945).
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identified as such; prohibition of the unauthorized rebroadcast of pro
grams; equal treatment of political candidates;10 and prohibition of
censorship by the Commission of any program.11 With such limited restric
tions in the law and with the specific provision of the law that the
Commission may not censor programs, it would appear that primary responsibility
for program content and standards would rest with the broadcaster. Indeed,
the Commission itself has indicated as much.12
The Commission does, however, indirectly control program content.
From the Congressional mandate that stations should "operate in the public
interest, convenience, and necessity"13 the Commission can and does care
fully consider the programming of a station. Prior to the granting of a
license the Commission considers the programming which the applicant pro
poses to carry out. Upon application for renewal the Commission considers
848 Statutes At Large. 1089 (1945).
948 Statutes At Large. 1091 (1945).
1048 Statutes At Large. 1087 (1945).
U48 Statutes At Large. 1092 (1945).
"Federal Communication Commission, Public Service Responsibility of
Broadcast Licensees, (Washington, 1946). The Commission said, in part:
"primary responsibility for the American system of broadcasting rests with
the licensee of broadcast stations and network organizations. It is to the
stations and network rather than to federal regulation that listeners must
primarily turn for improved standards of program service. The Commission,
as licensing agency established by Congress, has a responsibility to consider
overall program interest determinations, but affirmative improvement of
program service must be the result primarily of other forces".
1348 Statutes At Large. 1064 (1934).
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the programming or studies such programming as has been done. Thus is the
Commission able to prescribe minimum standards governing program content.
In some instances the Commission has prescribed standards for future opera-
tions.14
In other ways, the Commission influences and guides program content.
In one instance the Commission set forth basic policy for renewal of
licenses 5 and individual Commissioners have tended to maintain these policies.
Congress has, from time to time, taken part in establishing program
standards.16 The Commission has also urged the public to become more vocal
in regard to programming.
The foregoing discussion regarding programming control and regulation
is included in this study of federal statutes relative to political broad
casting because any degree of program control may, in some manner, affect
all broadcasting of a political nature carried by a radio or television
station.
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, which set forth legal
requirements regarding political braodcasting, was referred to earlier. This
is the only statutory provision in the U. S. Code dealing specifically with
this problem. The purpose of this section is to give a firm legal base to
14
F.C.C., Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, op.
cit.. p. 16.
15Ibid.
Carl J. Friedrich and Evelyn Sternberg, "Congress and the Control
of Radio Broadcasting", American Political Science Review, XXXVII (1934),
814.
'F.C.C., Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, op.
cit.. p. 20.
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the "policy of equal opportunity".18 Most of the detailed determinations
regarding political broadcasting are to be found in the rules and regula
tions of the Commission itself or in court decisions affecting political
broadcasting. These matters will be dealt with in later chapters.
Section 315 of the Act, as amended by Public Law 554, 82nd Congress
(1952) reads:
(a) If any licensee shall permit a candidate who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all such candidates for that
office in the use of such broadcasting station:
provided, that such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is
imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its
station by any such candidate.
(b) The charge made for the use of any broadcasting
station for any of the purposes set forth in
this section shall not exceed the charges made
for comparable use of such station for other
purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of
this section.
Subsections (b) and (c) are new and the historical background of
these provisions will be dealt with subsequently. Subsection (a) was
originally enacted as Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927.
Bills regarding broadcasting were introduced into the 68th and 69th
19
Congresses. None of these proposals contained a provision such as is to
be found in the present statute covering political broadcasting. Early
18
Summers, op. cit., p. 207.
19'HR 7357 (68th Congress), HR 5589 (69th Congress).
23
discussion centered on failure to provide facilities reasonable for
the transmission of radio communications. Soon, however, the subject of
political broadcasting entered the picture.20 In large part, the contro
versial issue of political broadcasting arose because of the failure of
several facilities (radio stations) to provide equal opportunities.21
There were other reasons but this one tends to stand out.22
HR 5589 J made provision that if the Interstate Commerce Commission
or any other federal agency certified that a broadcasting station charged
unreasonable rates, made unreasonable regulations, carried out unreason
able practices, which tended to be discriminatory or failed to provide
reasonable facilities for the transmission of information, the Secretary
of Commerce was empowered to revoke license of that station.
Another provision was added and became Section 14 of the Radio Act
of 1927. This was the provision that the Secretary of Commerce could
revoke the license of any licensee guilty of making any unjust or un
reasonable charge or who was guilty of any discrimination.24 No enforce
ment of this provision was ever made. In one instance, the Interstate
Commerce Commission held that this section applied only to common carriers
and that the I.C.C. had no jurisdiction it could apply to broadcasting
20
E. E. Willis, Foundations in Broadcasting (New York, 1951), p. 12.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23HR 5589 (68th Congress).
24, .
44 Statutes At Large. 1166, Sec. 14 (1927).
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rates or practices.25 in the Act of 1934, Section 14 was dropped and
provisions were made that radio stations used for broadcast purposes were
not common carriers.2*>
Harry P. Warner had this to say in regard to events subsequent to
passage of the 1927 Act:
Both defamation by radio and equality of treatment for
political candidates was discussed on the floor of both
houses. Representative Blanton of Texas on two occasions
averred that the bill should regulate and control defama
tory charges made in the course of political attacks.
Representative White of Maine replied that the Common law
and state statutes would protect any individual and that
the proposed federal regulation or control was 'very
near censorship1. Mr. Blanton attempted to amend the
bill providing for the Radio Act of 1927 so as to forbid
defamation by radio but his proposal did not carry. On
the Senate side Mr. Howell of Nebraska voiced similar cri
ticism.27
After the passage of the 1927 Act some members of Congress still
felt that Section 18 needed attention. Such feeling ultimately resulted
in 1933 in the passage of a bill to broaden the provisions covering
political broadcasting but a pocket veto by the President prevented the
measure from becoming law.28 This would have amended Section 18 to
read as follows:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is
legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of such station; and if
25StaShine Products Co. v. WGBB, 188 I.C.C. 271 (1928).
2648 Statutes At Large. 1064 (1934).
27Harry P. Warner, Radio and Television Law (New York, 1953), p. 315,
28Ibid.
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any licensee shall permit any person to use a
broadcasting station in support of or in opposition
to any candidate for public office, or in the pre
sentation of views on a public question to be voted
upon at any election, or by a governmental agency,
he shall afford equal opportunity to an equal number
of other persons to use such station in support of
an opposing candidate for such public office, or to
reply to a person who has used such broadcasting
station in support of or in opposition to such a
candidate, or for the presentation of opposite views
on such public questions.
(b) The Commission shall make rules and regulations to
carry this provision into effect. No such Licensee
shall exercise censorship over any material broadcast
in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
No obligation is imposed upon any licensee, or for
the presentation of views on any side of a public
question.
(c) The rates charged for the use of any station for any
of the purposes set forth in this section shall not
exceed the regular rates charged for the use of said
stations to advertisers furnishing regular programs,
and shall not be discriminatory as between persons
using the station for such purposes.29
In commenting upon the proposal quoted above Warner said:
At the Senate Hearing on HR 7716, Mr. Bellows, Chair
man of the National Association of Broadcasters...
stated that the present section, Section 18 of the
Act of 1927 which precluded any exercise of censor
ship by the station over 'political broadcasters'
had been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
to hold the licensee jointly responsible with the
speaker for any libelous or slanderous utterances.
(See 30 below). He asserted that broadcasters were
ready to accept the responsibility for libel and
slander 'but in that case we must have the right to
go over the speeches in advance and see what is in
them, for we cannot wait until they are on the air'.
Senator Couzens, Chairman of the Senate Committee,
29HR 7716 (72nd Congress).
30Sorenson v. Wood. 123 Nebraska 348 (1948).
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concurred in this suggestion. He was of the opinion
that a station should protect itself to the same
extent as newspapers which examine articles and
advertisements for libelous statements before publi
cations. 31
In spite of all attempts to amend the provisions of Section 18 of
the Act of 1927, none succeeded and with the passage of the Act of 1934
the section was left unchanged.
In 1952, Congress amended Section 315 of the 1934 act to provide
fair and equitable charges to political candidates as compared with
other advertisers. The amendment simply provided that broadcasters could
not charge politicians more than regular commercial broadcasters for air
time or facilities.32
Efforts are continuing today to modify provisions of this important
section (315) of the Communication Act of 1934. HR 3789 of the 84th
Congress would amend Section 315 so as to withdraw from individuals
convicted of subversive activities and members of certain subversive
organizations the right of equal opportunity for use of broadcasting
facilities in political campaigns. This bill, however, was not passed.
The passage of HR 3789, would have caused the F.C.C. to ask
Congress to give jurisdiction to Federal District Courts in determining
the right of political candidates who have been denied "equal time"
under Section 315 (a).
The above suggestion was made in the F.C.C. comments on the bill. F.C.C.
Chairman, George C. McConnaughey, told the House Commerce Committee's
31
Warner, op. cit.. pp. 316-317.
3266 Statutes At Large, 717 (1952).
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Transportation and Communications Subcommittee the Commission "does
not wish to express an opinion on the advisability or necessity of such
legislation". He said the F.C.C. believed such a bill would be
constitutional but determination of whether a person belongs to a sub
versive group would be difficult and complicated for the F.C.C. and
delay would be inevitable. In deciding these matters when an election
is taking place, time is of essence, he said.
The Commissioner said the F.C.C. believes all determination made
under Section 315 should be made by a federal court, which, he continued,
is the most appropriate forum for securing the necessary prompt and
effective review of these questions. ^
HR 4814, also under consideration by the 84th Congress, would have
amended the Communications Act of 1934 so as to prohibit liability from
being imposed upon a licensee because of defamatory statements made in
a broadcast by a political candidate unless such licensee participates
35
in such broadcast with intent to defame.
The Commission has given its endorsements to this proposed legisla
tion. Chairman McConnaughey told the subcommittee considering the measure
that the Commission has taken the view that because of the prohibition
against censorship, licensees1 are immune from liability for defamatory
statements broadcast by candidates, but that there has never been any final
determination by the Supreme Court of this point. According to Chairman
33
"Commissioner Speaks." Broadcasting-Telecasting Magazine, February
6, 1956, p. 56.
34Ibid.
35HR 4814 (84th Congress).
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McConnaughey, many states have passed libel protection laws in varying de-
grees, ° These laws are not consistent and there remain several states
with no protective libel laws at all. Inconsistency in state laws is
very unfortunate, the Commissioner said, particularly where a station's
programs may be heard in several states.
The Chairman implied that the F.C.C. would like to see Congress
require stations to warn candidates in advance concerning the consequences
37
of uttering statements that are clearly libelous or slanderous.
A third bill, which proposes to change Section 315, HR 6810, would
allow a radio or television broadcaster or a network to present a political
candidate on news, interviews, forums, panels and debate programs without
being required to make "equal time" available to a candidate's opponents,
38
as is now required.
A similar bill was presented to the 86th Congress to amend the
Communications Act of 1934. It provided that the equal time provisions
with respect to candidates for public office shall not apply to news and
39
similar programs. In this amendment Congress stated that Section 315 (a)
of the Communications Act of 1934 is amended by inserting at the end there
of the following sentence:
Be it enacted.,. .Appearance by a legally qualified candidate
on any---
1) bona fide newscast,
JDSee Chapter IV of the present work.
^"Commissioner Speaks," Broadcasting-Telecasting Magazine, February
6, 1956, p. 57.
38HR 6810 (84th Congress).
39S 2426 (86th Congress).
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2) bona fide news interviews,
3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of
the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the
subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or
4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events
(including but not limited to political conventions and
activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to
be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of
this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentences
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in
connection with the presentation of newscast, news in
terviews, news documentaries and on-the-spot coverage
of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them
under this act to operate in the public interest and to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.^
This bill was fully accepted and recommended by the F.C.C. It
was hoped that this bill would help the F.C.C. to handle some of the
erroneous questions that it had been receiving regarding this matter.
Still another bill, which would amend Section 315's equal time
provisions, has been introduced in Congress. This bill, S. 3308, would
leave the section unchanged as regards all candidates except those
for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency. For the latter, broadcasters
would have to furnish equal time for the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates of the major political parties only. Provisions are made for
candidates of parties other than the Democratic and Republican parties by
a requirement that any other party, in order to qualify for equal time
with the two major parties, must have polled 4% of the votes in the last
presidential election or must present a petition with names totaling 1%
of the vote at the last presidential election.
Another bill, introduced by the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D.,
Texas), was designed to relieve broadcasters of the requirements that they
furnish equal time to candidates of small minority parties or splinter
40'73 Statutes At Large, 557 (1959).
30
groups. It would also revise the legal amount a national political
party committee may spend in any presidential election and elections
for members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Spending in the
presidential electoun would be legalized upward from the present $3 million
to $12.3 million. The bill would also authorize income tax deductions
for political campaigns only up to $100.^ This bill never came up for
consideration.
The late Senator Richard L. Neuberger (D., Oregon) introduced a bill,
S. 3242, that would provide government financing of federal election
campaigns. It would allow equal payment by the government to both major
parties. For 1960 the total amount would have been $11,065,985. Allocations
to each party in a presidential election year would amount to twenty cents
for each voter based upon the average vote for the past two presidential
elections. In non-presidential election years, the amount would be fifteen
cents per voter, based on the average total votes in the two previous
off-year elections.
Senator Neuberger's bill would also limit individual campaign contri
butions to $100. Each party would be allowed to raise from private
sources an amount no larger than the governmental payment.
The Oregon Senator said he introduced his bill to avoid the "evils"
of large private campaign donations. He indicated that large campaign
expenses have come about because of the "tremendous cost of reaching
people through the modern media of communication, particularly through ra
dio and television". Even though a similar bill, HR 9488, was introduced
41S. 3308 (84th Congress).
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into the House, neither bill has ever come up for consideration.
Finally, in regard to Section 315, the 86th Congress on August 24,
1960, enacted a joint resolution. This resolution suspended for the
1960 presidential campaign the equal opportunity requirement of Section
315 (a). This resolution was especially for the President and Vice-
President nominees. It stated:
Resolved...that that part of Section 315 (a) of the
Communication Act of 1934, as amended, which required
any licensee of a broadcast station who permits any
public office to use a broadcasting station to afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such broadcasting stations,
is suspended for the period of the 1960 presidential
and vice-presidential campaigns with respect to
nominees for the office of President and Vice-Presi
dent of the United States. Nothing in the foregoing
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters from the
obligation imposed upon them under this act to operate
in public interest.43
This joint resolution took form and came into being for several
reasons. First of all, it was backed by the F.C.C. because of the increased
requests brought to it by the numerous candidates for the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency. Secondly, because of the rising public interest in
politics and pressures upon local radio stations by candidates seeking
public offices. Also the tremendous number of candidates for Presidency
and Vice-Presidency (some 15 or more) tended to cause public confusion.
The bill was passed, according to Gilman Udell, to enhance the public's
42Gilman G. Udell, Radio Laws of the United States (Washington,
1962), p. 209.
4374 Statutes At Large, 554 (1960).
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interest and eliminate some of the confusion taking place around these
two high offices.
All these bills mentioned in this chapter sought in one way or
another to give "equal opportunity and fairness" to all candidates and
groups involved in seeking public office.
44Udell, op. cit., p. 210.
CHAPTER III
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION CONCERNING POLITICAL BROADCASTING
A network may give equal time to two speakers taking opposing
points of view on some important political question. But member stations
are not required to carry sustaining programs, unless they wish to do
so and this is sometimes the case. For instance, the representative of
one side of a political question may be put on the air by 30 or 40
stations of the same network, while the representative of the opposite
viewpoint finds himself appearing on only 8 or 9 stations of the same
network.
Because of this very aspect, broadcasters cannot reserve their
facilities for the presentation of a single political viewpoint or creed.
It must be an instrumentality by which the public can be reached in the
presentation of the pro and the con of issues and views. Since radio
must present both sides, the rules and regulations of the F.C.C, arose
largely to protect and provide for this fairness on the air.
However, the Communications Act of 1934 was also designed to provide
a broad administrative base by which the Federal Communications Commission
might be guided in the regulation of broadcasting in the United States.
1H. B. Summers, Radio Censorship (New York, 1939), p. 204.
2Ibid.
^Summers, op. cit., p. 205.
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The law empowered the Commission to "perform any and all acts, make
such rules and regulations, issue such orders, not inconsistent with
this act, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions".
To fulfill its responsibility to Congress, the Commission had to
promulgate and enforce many rules and regulations for the conduct of
broadcasting in this country. Such rules and regulations actually had
their beginning in the early days of the Federal Radio Commission and
were released from time to time as "General Orders". In 1930, the Com
mission issued its first formal, comprehensive set of regulations.*
At irregular intervals since that time the Commission has modified,
changed, and reissued such rules and regulations as it deemed advisable.
Such rules and regulations may be catalogued in any number of ways. One
such listing showed rules covering the following topics:











12) Power and antenna heights
13) Rebroadcasts
14) Recordings and transcriptions
15) Reports to be filed




20) Transfers and assignments
448 Statutes At Large, 1064, Sec. 4 (1934).
-"Federal Radio Commission, Practices and Procedures (Washington,
1930), p. 21.
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All the above classifications are of interest to broadcasters and
could be dealt with at great length and in great detail. We will deal,
however, only with such rules and regulations as the Commission has
established regarding political broadcasting.
Section (3.190) of the rules for AM (amplitude modulated) covers
radio covers political broadcasting; Section (3.290) of the rules covers
political broadcasting by FM (frequency modulated) radio and is identical
with Section (3.190); Section (3.657) deals with political broadcasting
on television and is virtually identical with Section (3.190). The first
named Section (3.190) is quoted here since its provisions are representa
tive of all types of broadcasting:
Section (3.190) Definition, (a) A 'legally qualified
candidate1 means any person who has publicly announced
that he is a candidate for nomination or election in
a primary, special or general election, municipal, county,
state or national, and who meets the qualifications
prescribed by the applicable to hold the office for
which he is a candidate, so that he may be voted for by
the electorate directly or by means of delegates or
electors.
(b) General Requirements--No station licensee is required
to permit the use of its facilities by any legally quali
fied candidate for public office but if any licensee
shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candi
date for that office to use such facilities.
(c) Rates and Practices--(1) the rates, if any charged
all such candidates for the same office shall be uniform
and shall not be rebated by any means, direct or indirect.
(d) Records, Inspections--Every licensee shall keep and
permit public inspection of a complete record of all
requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of
candidates for public office, together with an appropriate
notation showing the disposition made by the licensee of
such request, and the charges made, if any request is
granted.
Some of the provisions of the Commission's rules and regulations
bear close examination. In so far as can be determined, the term "legally
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qualified" candidate has never been judicially tested.6 The individual
states are empowered to establish election laws by state statute and
such statutes generally provide for determination of legally qualified
candidates. Among the 50 states there is, unfortunately, no uniform
definition. One authority has this to say regarding the matter:
The words 'legally qualified' manifestly limit the word
'candidate1. In the Federal Constitution there are
certain familiar qualifications prescribed for those
who seek federal elective office.
But it is within the competency of the States to
control the matter of election, so even with regard to
legal qualifications in addition to those found in the
Constitution.
Each State has statutory prerequisites to printing
a candidate's name on the ballot. The prerequisites
differ widely among the states, and in several states
the conditions precedent to being placed on the primary
ballot are distinct from those governing the final
election. In Maryland, for example, a person is not a
'legally qualified' candidate who is not on the ballot.
In several States, however, the voter may write on
the ballot his choice for the office (or use a 'poster'
or 'sticker') and if a majority follow suit the candi
date so honored would be elected. Thus, although not
a legally qualified candidate in the sense of having
met the ballot or filing for office (unless not quali
fied in some other respect, such as residence, citizen
ship, etc.) and he probably could invoke the rights
conferred by the Communications Act. But, as shown
above, some states do not allow any amendments on the
printed ballot, so in fact the provision of the Com
munication Act has limited application and in practice
may result in unequal situation. In any event, to
avoid confusion, and set a definite standard, it would
seem desirable to promulgate a rule which would apply
uniformly and not depend for interpretation upon the
myriad election laws.?




As indicated earlier, Congress has pending a bill which would bar
subversives from taking advantage of the time provision of the act.8
Some states, including Georgia, have outlawed membership in the Communist
party, but others have not.9 What then would be the status of a broad
caster confronted with a request for equal time for a Communist candidate?
The Commission has indicated that under the present rule the Communist
candidate, if legally qualified, would be entitled to equal opportunities.10
In an effort to give all broadcasters the benefit of its interpre
tation of rules and regulations concerning political broadcasting, the
Commission, on September 14, 1954, published a series of questions and
answers. Publication was made in the Federal Register of that date and
copies were distributed to broadcasters for their guidance. These rules
and regulations of the Commission are to insure fair and equal opportuni
ties to candidates for public office.11
8HR 3789 (84th Congress).
9
Federal Communication Commission, Reports For License Renewal
Docket No. 6987, (Washington, 1948). " '
10
Federal Register (Washington, 1962).
11Summers, op. cit.. p. 205.
CHAPTER IV
STATE REGULATION
In the absence of federal control of defamation by the broadcast
media, existing state law had to protect the candidate from defamatory
remarks and protect his civil rights. Congress foresaw this when it
passed the Radio Act of 1927. The House defeated a proposal that de
famation be regulated and controlled by federal statute.2 This was
done on the theory that the common law and state statutes were ample to
protect any individual. An unsuccessful attempt was made to get the bill
amended so as to prohibit defamation.
However, laws covering defamation by the broadcast media vary
widely from state to state. Greatest variations come in areas of
statutory determination of whether such defamation is libel or slander
and in the area of responsibility regarding political broadcasts during
which defamation is uttered. Is broadcast defamation libel or is it
slander? Common law divides defamation into two classes.5 Slander is
1H. B. Summers, Radio Censorship (New York, 1939), p. 121.
2HR 9971 (69th Congress).
3U. S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., (1922).
4Ibid.
Summers, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
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used to describe oral defamation, while libel is the actionable form for
written defamation.
According to Summers, any answer to the question posed earlier
regarding whether broadcast defamation is libel or slander cannot be
found in common law. Only a few courts have dealt with the problem and
their rulings were very different due to the wide variances among states
in regard to statutory requirements. An Iowa court, for instance, held
that, on the basis of an Iowa statute, a defamatory statement over the
radio was slander.
g
The case of Sorenson v. Wood is considered an authoritative
statement on the proposition that broadcast defamation is libel. How
ever, in this particular case the contention may have been based upon
the fact that the tort was committed by reading from a prepared script.
What the outcome might have been if the action had resulted from an ad
lib remark is a matter for conjecture. Just what have the courts in
dicated to be regarded as ad lib remarks, extemporaneous speeches which
were defamatory, or defamatory remarks inserted by the speakers? They
appear to agree on no common ground in this area. Some indicated that
such remarks are libel, while others insist that they are slander.
In the case of Locke v. Gibbons,^ the Supreme Court of New York
said that words interpolated into a prepared script were slander. The
"Summers, op. cit., p. 123.
^Harry P. Warner, Radio and Television Law (New York, 1953),
pp. 447-448.
8Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Nebraska 348 (1948).
9Locke v. Gibbons, 299 New York Supplement 188 (1936).
40
opinion said, in part: "the schism in the law of defamation between
the older wrong of slander and the answer the newer one of libel cannot
be erased by the courts".
In the case of Irwin v. Ashurt the Supreme Court of Oregon said
"the person who hears defamatory matter over the air ordinarily does not
know whether or not the speaker is reading from a manuscript. Furthermore,
what difference does it make to such a person, so far as the effect is
concerned". Thus the issue remains confused. Finally, a third classifi
cation is found in the case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting
Company.^ The opinion in this case defined defamation by radio as a new
tort "with a distinct form of action...which possess many attributes of both
libel and slander but differs from each".
The problem of broadcast defamation is a complex and detailed one
and would require an entire study to do it justice.12 Our concern here,
however, is defamation occurring as a part of political broadcasting.
Under these circumstances the problem becomes more troublesome. Defamation
occurs when an opposing candidate for public office tries to defame the
character of the other candidate in the public eye. ^ It is an attempt
to destroy the public image of the other candidate and raise one's own
image.14
10Irwin v. Ashurt, 158 Oregon 61 (1951).
11Summit Hotel Co. v. N.B.C., 336 Pa. 182 (1950).
^Summers, op. cit., p. 39.
•^Summers, op. cit., p. 40.
14Ibid.
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Federal,,Statutes, as well as rules and regulations of the F.C.C.,
prohibit prior censorship of political broadcasts.^ Yet, in many states,
broadcasters are caught on the horns of a dilemma because of state statutes
imposing liability for all materials broadcast.
Such a situation immediately raises the question of whether stations
are required to permit political broadcasts containing material that is
clearly defamatory. Such a requirement would immediately subject the
station to liability under many state defamation statutes.
The leading case in this regard is Sorenson v. Wood, ° previously
referred to in another connection. In this case a candidate for public
office made a political address over station KFAB in Nebraska. According
to Sorenson, the plaintiff, Wood, in the course of his speech uttered some
defamatory remarks. Therefore, one of the defenses urged by the radio
station was that according to provisions of the Communications Act of 1934,
radio stations have the obligation of providing equal facilities on the
air to all candidates for public office. Since such an obligation is
mandatory under the law, KFAB argued that it should be relieved of any
liability for defamatory remarks made in a speech over which it has no
control. The station contended further that Section 315 of the Act pro
hibiting censorship of political broadcasting conferred an absolute
privilege with respect to the speech.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected these contentions. The Court
held that the federal statute gave the broadcasting station no privileged
position in the matter of transmission of libelous material, even though
15Ibid.
16Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Nebraska 348 (1940).
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the station had no right of censorship, and that it was no defense to an
action for defamation by radio.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska reasoned that the prohibition against
censorship was concerned only with "word as their political and partisan
trend." The decision said in part:
We do not think that Congress intended by this language
in the Radio Act of 1927, (as reenacted in the Act of
1934) to authorize or sanction the publication of libel
and thus raise an issue without due process or without
just compensation (Constitution, fifth amendment). This
is particularly true where any argument for the exercise
of police power and for any argument for to be derived
would seem to be against any such interpretation rather
than to be served by it. So far as we adopt the inter
pretation that seems in accord with the intent of Congress
and of the Radio Commission. We are of the opinion that
the prohibition of censorship of material broadcast over
the radio station of a licensee any privilege to join
and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant any
immunity from the consequences of such action. The
Federal Radio Act confers no privilege to broadcasting
stations to publish defamatory utterances.*7
A further defense offered in the above case was that the radio station
is, in reality, a common carrier and is protected by the traditional
exemption of common carrier from liability for defamation. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska rejected this argument, too, on the ground that a
station could choose, to a large extent, whom it would permit to broadcast
over its facilities. The Court said a station was not bound to permit a
political candidate to talk but was only required to give permission to
all when it gave permission to one.
The F.C.C. has taken the view of the situation that is directly
opposed to that taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court in the Sorenson v. Wood
case. The Commission discussed the question for the first time in 1948
17Ibid.
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when it reviewed the application of the Port Huron Company for renewal
of its license.1** In this instance the Commission said that a broad
caster's censorship or rejection of a political speech because it con
tains defamatory material is a violation of Section 315 of the
Communications Act. The Commission said further that it believed Section
315 relieved licensees from liability under state law for the broadcast
of defamatory material contained in political speeches.
In any consideration of views of the Commission, it would be well
to point out that the Commission has full authority to decide the first
point, i.e., that any censorship of political speeches, even for the
purposes of removing defamatory material is prohibited by federal statute
and regulations of the Commission itself. Thus a station could well be
denied renewal of its license for violation of this edict.
The second point made by the Commission, indicated that it believed
broadcasters are relieved of liability under state laws, because in this
area the Commission itself is without authority. Such a determination is
left solely to the courts of the several states by their interpretations
of the mandate of the various legislatures.
Thus the broadcaster, in some instances, finds himself in an almost
impossible position. In order to solve this dilemma several steps could
be taken:
1) Adoption of federal statutes permitting stations to
delete defamatory material from political scripts.
2) Adoption of federal statutes imposing criminal
sanctions on broadcast speakers.
18Federal Communication Commission, Annual Report (Washington, 1948),
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3) Adoptions of federal statutes covering broadcast
defamation by political candidates.
4) Uniform state action in this regard.
Congress has been fully cognizant of the problem for a number of
years, and has undoubtedly been aware of the current broadcasting practice,
19
concurred in by the Commission, of broadcasters examining scripts prior
to broadcasts by political candidates. Stations, of course, may not
delete nor require changes but they are free to suggest. Thus it might
be desirable on the part of Congress to extend statutory provision for
deletion of defamatory material during such review.
Criminal sanctions could be imposed against speakers which make
it unlawful for persons using broadcast facilities to do so with the
intent to utter defamatory statements. This might tend to eliminate
potentially defamatory statements by financially irresponsible parties.
A federal statute covering broadcasting defamation by political
candidates has been proposed. Such a statute has been introduced in
20
Congress. This would amend the present Section 315 so as to prohibit
liability from being imposed upon a licensee because of defamatory
statements made in a broadcast by a political candidate unless the
licensee participated in the broadcast with an intent to defame. Warner
21
says it is an open question whether such a law would be constitutional.
He indicates that while Congress might enact such a statute under its
19Warner, op. cit., p. 32.
20HR 4814 (84th Congress).
Warner, op. cit., p. 451.
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authority to regulate and control interstate commerce. The problem
would arise whether Congress could "create, extend or abridge existing
state laws governing civil rights of defendants" is one to consider.
Warner also indicates such a law may have a tendency to abridge civil
rights and the right Of free speech.
However, individual state action seems to be another method of
giving broadcaster's relief from their dilemma. The Council of State
Governments has been seeking such action for some time and in 1945 drew
up a model statute and sent it to state and federal agencies and legis
lators.23
The Council's model statute reads:
The owners, licensee of operator of a visual or aural
radio broadcasting station or network or stations, or
the agents of such stations or network of stations,
shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory
statement uttered over the facilities of such station
or network by any candidate for public office, but
this section shall not apply in the event said owner,
licensee or operator, agent or employee shall will
fully, knowingly, and with intent to defame, parti
cipate in such broadcast.^4
Virtually all of the fifty states have enacted some form of broadcast
libel relief, although not necessarily in the same form as indicated above
25
by the Council. Some utilized wording as proposed by the National
Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters in their efforts to
22Warner, op. cit., p. 451.
23J. G. Moser, Radio and the Law (Los Angeles, 1947), p. 42.
25HR 4814 (84th Congress).
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achieve standardized state action. State legislatures, in varying degrees,
have lessened the chances of a broadcaster being held liable for defama
tion.
In Georgia, broadcasters have a model defamation statute which is
similar to the statute proposed by the National Association of Radio and
Television Broadcasters. The Georgia statute reads as follows:^°
Sec. 105-712: Radio Broadcasting Stations; Liability For
Defamatory Statements
The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and
the agents or employees of such owner, licensee, or opera
tor shall not be published or uttered in or as a part of
a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such
owner, licensee, operator, or such agent or employee has
to exercise due care to prevent the publication or ut
terance of such statement in such broadcast.
Sec. 105-713: Same: Liability for Political Broadcasts
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or
operator or the agents or employee of any such owner,
licensee or operator of such a station be held liable for
any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the
facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of
any candidate for public office.
Sec. 105-714: Same: Damages Allowable
In any such action for damages for any defamatory
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a
visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining party
shall be allowed only such actual consequential, or
punitive damages as have been alleged and proved.
The Georgia statute has never been tested in the courts insofar
as can be determined.
Moser, op. cit., p. 47.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Primary control of the broadcast media in the United States rests
with the national government. Congress, acting tinder the commerce clause
of the Constitution, passed the first radio act in 1910, but this did
little more than to establish regulations requiring radio on board ships
at sea. In 1912, Congress passed the first act designed to regulate
this new medium. In 1927, the Radio Act passed by Congress created the
first regulatory commission for broadcasting. Congress named the agency
the Federal Radio Commission and established standards for the regulation of
broadcasting operations in this country. In 1934, as part of a sweeping
reorganization of the government, Congress brought regulation of telephone
and telegraph (with the exception of tariffs) under a new body, the
Federal Communications Commission. This body was also given regulatory
authority over broadcasting in all its forms.
In regulating broadcasting in the United States, Congress set up
several requirements which were relatively unique. Unlike property rights
under common law, Congress decreed that no property right in a radio
frequency or a channel was created through use. Congress set up a unique
standard for determination of whether broadcast licenses should be
granted. This standard was that such action must be in the public interest
or convenience and for public necessity. Congress also required that
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political candidates for the same office be accorded equal treatment
by broadcast licensees. Censorship of political speeches was prohibited,
as was censorship of any type by the federal government. The type of
censorship referred to here is action taken by any governing authority
to prevent the dissemination of false statements, inconvenient facts,
or displeasing opinions.1 Congress also stipulated that no alien could
be licensed as a broadcaster in the United States.
While no direct programming control is carried out by the federal
government, some indirect control may be shown. Acting under the con
gressional mandate, this control is imposed to insure that stations must
operate in the public interest and necessity. Therefore, the Federal
Communications Commission is able to insure the public that stations will
carry a reasonable number of "public service" type programs. Also
stations must maintain well-balanced programming, free from obscene or
indecent materials.
Federal statutes, implemented by rules and regulations of the
Federal Communications Commission, require equal treatment of political
candidates. Determination of who is actually a bona fide candidate is
a difficult process because of the variety of state election laws.2 The
requirement is that all legally qualified candidates for the same office
must be afforded equal opportunities in the use of station facilities.
There is no requirement that any licensee allow the use of his own
personal station by any other candidate. If such use is permitted, however,
^•H. B. Summers, Radio Censorship (New York, 1939), p. 190.
2Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America (Boston, 1956), p. 129.
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all charges and requirements must be identical.
A number of bills which would alter the present status of political
candidates, insofar as broadcasting is concerned, are pending in Congress.
One such bill would deny individuals convicted of subversive activities
the privileges of equal treatment. A second bill would exempt broadcasters
of programs by political candidates from liability for defamatory state
ments uttered by such candidates. This has reference to news, interviews,
forums, panels and debate programs without being required to make equal
time available to the candidate's opponents. Another proposal put before
Congress would relieve broadcasters of the requirement that they furnish
equal time to presidential and vice presidential candidates of small
minority parties or splinter groups. A bill proposed by the late Senator
Neuberger (D., Oregon) would provide government financing of federal
election campaigns because of the high cost of reaching people today
through radio and television.
The Federal Communications Commission, in interpreting its rules
and regulations covering political broadcasting, has indicated that the
equal time requirement applies only to the candidate himself and not to
those speaking for him or in his behalf. They have indicated that if a
candidate is also a public official and appears in his official capacity
his opponents are entitled to equal time. Equal time involves not only
the same amount of time on the air but also time at periods of the day
or night when audiences will be similar in size. The Commission has
^Summers, op. cit., p. 208.
^Summers, op. cit., p. 209.
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indicated that stations must give up commercial time if necessary in
order to meet the equal time requirement during election campaign. A
determination of whether or not to grant equal time may not be made on
the basis of the licensee's opinion concerning the candidate's chances
of election. The Commission requires that stations keep a public record
of all requests for time by political candidates. The Commission also
indicated therein the action to be taken regarding such requests.
Control of defamation by broadcast media rests primarily with the
states. Whether defamation by the broadcast media is libel or slander
has never been adequately determined with conflicting indications being
given by courts of different jurisdictions. Some authorities have sug
gested a new form of defamation. According to them, defamation by the
broadcast media is different from both libel and slander. Some states
have acted to prevent broadcasters from being caught on one hand by the
federal requirement prohibiting censorship of political broadcasts and
the common law statutes covering defamation. Such action has generally
been in the form of laws exempting broadcasters from action brought as
a result of political broadcasts unless such broadcaster knowingly par
ticipated in the defamation and was a party to it. Georgia has passed
such legislation.
In Georgia broadcasters have what could be called a "model defama
tion law", model in the sense that they are relieved of responsibility
for defamatory statements by a person appearing over their facilities
(except employees). However, this is the case only if it can be shown
that they exercised due care to prevent the defamation. No determination
has yet been made judicially of just exactly what constitutes due care.
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From a political point of view, perhaps the most vital function
of broadcasting is as an instrument of information and persuasion in
connection with the election of public officials.^ Congress has not
overlooked this factor; accordingly, congressional legislation has
sought to give the public free and full discussion over the broadcast
media. Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the high
service it has given our society. Its protection is then essential to
the very existence of democracy.' The airing of ideas releases pressures
which otherwise might become destructive. So Congress, in regulating
broadcasting, has adhered to the idea that full and free discussion keeps
a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and
o
strains that work to tear all civilizations apart. This is the main
reason why Congress and the Federal Communication Commission had to
enforce "equal opportunities" for any controversial issue dealing with
Q
public affairs. All sides must be heard in every controversial issue.
Another reason for this is that free and full discussion is the first
article of our faith. We established our political system on it.








The next great principle in the regulation of American broadcasting
is to keep it forever keyed to the needs of our democracy, that of
"fairness of the air"1. By this is meant that no discussion must ever be
one-sided so long as there can be found anyone to take the other side.
For one of the cornerstones of democracy is that the minority has a
12
right to be heard as well as the majority. This principle, therefore,
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